This paper investigates the link between factor prices, technology and factor demands. I estimate the effect of price-induced technology adoption on energy demand in the U.S. manufacturing sector, using plant data from the Census of Manufactures, 1963Manufactures, -1997. I compare the energy efficiency of entrants and incumbents to measure the effect of technology adoption on the demand for energy. A 10 percent increase in the price of energy causes technology adoption that reduces the energy demand of entrants by 1 percent. This elasticity has two implications: first, technology adoption explains a statistically significant but relatively small fraction of changes in energy demand in the 1970s and 1980s; and second, technology adoption can reduce the long run effect of energy prices on growth, but by less than previous research has found.
Introduction
This paper investigates the link between factor prices, technology and factor demands. I estimate the effect of price-induced technology adoption on energy demand in the U.S. manufacturing sector, and find that an increase in the price of energy causes technology adoption that significantly reduces demand.
Technology adoption plays a central role in the relationship between energy prices and long run growth. Amid recent concerns that rising oil prices may harm the U.S. economy, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan predicted that, "Unless oil prices fall back, some of the more oil-intensive parts of our capital stock would ... be displaced, as was the case following the price increases of the late 1970s."
1 Many economists have argued that energy prices have a negative effect on GDP in the short run, but that technological change reduces energy demand and allows GDP to recover in the long run.
Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) make this argument formally. In their model, technology is "puttyclay"; a plant chooses the capital to energy ratio of its machines, and cannot adjust it later.
Because the capital to energy ratio is fixed in the short run, energy demand is inelastic, and a price increase causes a large decrease in output. In the long run, plants choose a higher capital to energy ratio, reducing energy demand and increasing output.
In accordance with this model's predictions, total energy demand fell soon after the price increases in the 1970s, and output recovered. For two reasons, however, there is little direct evidence that technological change explains these patterns. First, the oil price increases were aggregate shocks, making it impossible to infer causality from a purely time series relationship between the price of energy and energy demand.
Second, aggregate data does not distinguish substitution along the energy demand curve from a shift of the curve due to technological change. Figure 1 shows this ambiguity, plotting the price of energy and energy demand, D(A, σ), where A is the level of technology and σ is the energy price elasticity of demand for the particular technology. The economy begins at the point (E 0 , P 0 ) and when the price increases to P 1 , energy demand falls to E 1 . If the initial energy demand curve were D σ (A 0 , σ 1 ), plants would substitute away from energy and move along the curve. Alternatively, substitution possibilities may be limited with the technology, and the initial demand curve would be D(A 0 , σ 0 ). To reach the point (E 1 , P 1 ), firms would adopt technology A 1 , and the demand curve would shift to D A (A 1 , σ 0 ). Thus, firms may have moved to the point (E 1 , P 1 ) either by substituting or by adopting new technology. It is necessary to estimate the initial demand curve for energy to determine whether technology adoption has occurred.
1 Remarks to the National Italian American Foundation, Washington, D.C., October 15, 2004. The empirical strategy employs two techniques to address these issues, allowing me to estimate the effect of price-induced technology adoption on energy demand. First, the use of plant level data allows me to exploit cross sectional variation in the effect of an aggregate shock.
Because industries vary in their energy intensity, a given shock affects industries differently.
Second, I compare the energy efficiency of entering and existing plants. Assuming that existing plants cannot adopt technology, they move along their demand curve when the price of energy increases. The comparison between incumbents and entrants reveals the effect of technology adoption because if entering plants use the same technology, they would have the same energy efficiency as incumbents. If they use less energy than existing plants, this difference would correspond to an inward shift of their demand curve.
2 I find that a 10 percent increase in the price of energy leads to technology adoption that causes a one percent decrease in energy demand. The real price of energy rose by a factor of about 2.5 between 1972 and 1982, so that, relative to the difference in 1972, entrants in 1982
were 25 percent more efficient than incumbents.
The results imply that technology adoption is of lesser importance than theoretical and anecdotal evidence suggest. Substitution and changes in industry composition explain a larger fraction of the historical reduction in energy use in U.S. manufacturing. 3 Technology adoption reduces energy prices' long run effect on output by a relatively small amount.
I now discuss the identification strategy in more detail. Energy prices are potentially endogenous; for example, technological change could reduce demand and lower prices. To address this concern I construct a fixed-weight index of the total price of energy. The index uses the sector-wide average prices of different fuels and electricity, and should not include the effects of technological change, substitution or industry-specific shocks to output demand. 4 The estimating equation rests upon three assumptions. First, the total factor productivity (TFP) differential between entering and existing plants is uncorrelated with the price of energy.
Second, the elasticity of substitution is constant and equal for entrants and incumbents. Third, existing plants do not adopt new technology. While these assumptions are strong, they allow me to estimate a linear equation and compare the response of incumbents and entrants to energy prices. In the remainder of the empirical analysis, I document that the first and third assumptions seem to hold in practice, and that relaxing the second assumption does not affect the results.
More specifically, a plant's TFP affects its energy demand. If an increase in the price of energy causes the entry of plants with higher than average TFP (as in the model discussed below) the estimate would be biased away from zero. That is, when the price is high, entrants would be more efficient because they require less of all inputs, but otherwise use the same technology.
Several empirical approaches suggest this is not a major concern.
Second, regarding the substitution elasticity of entrants and incumbents, Diamond, McFadden and Rodriguez (1978) argue that it is difficult to empirically distinguish technological change from a change in the substitution elasticity. For example, consider Figure 1 , and assume that plants initially operate on the demand curve D(A 0 , σ 0 ). After a price shock entrants can either be on the demand curve D σ (A 0 , σ 1 ), which has a greater price elasticity than the original technology, or on the curve D A (A 1 , σ 0 ), which is an inward shift of the original curve. It appears that the baseline estimate reflects the latter case; the short run price elasticity, σ, is similar for entrants and incumbents.
Finally, I assume that existing plants do not adopt technology. To the extent that this assumption does not hold, the results would underestimate the total effect of technology adoption.
As documented below, the average incumbent does not invest in new machines or retire old capital in response to the price of energy, which is consistent with this assumption, and suggests that the bias may not be large.
This paper estimates the strength of the relationship between the price of energy, technology and energy demand. Theoretical work on price-induced technological change began with Hicks (1932) , who argued that technology is directed towards factors with high prices. Work on induced innovation (e.g. Binswanger, 1974) and directed technological change (e.g. Acemoglu, 2002) has refined the original analysis, and predicts that relative profit incentives raise the demand for certain types of technology. These models typically focus on innovation and abstract from the adoption decision. However, a finding of limited adoption would imply a limited amount of innovation.
Several recent papers study the effect of the price of energy on innovation and technology adoption. 5 This work focuses on specific technologies in a few industries, and it is difficult to extrapolate the results to the sector-or economy-wide level. Popp (2001 and examines induced innovation and technology adoption in several manufacturing industries. Popp estimates the elasticity of energy-saving patents to the price of energy, and the effect of these patents on energy efficiency. Similarly to this study, Popp finds that one-third of the observed decline in energy use was due to induced innovation. Thus, in both the energy intensive industries studied by Popp and across the entire manufacturing sector (considered in this paper), technological change has a limited role in explaining observed changes in energy demand. Doms and Dunne (1995) and Pizer et al. (2002) find that high energy prices cause the adoption of specific types of energy-saving technologies in several manufacturing industries.
They focus on the adoption of a variety of energy related technologies. These studies implement a different empirical strategy from this paper, exploiting cross sectional variation of energy prices in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The authors conclude that energy prices have a significant effect on technology adoption.
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Several studies have examined the effect of energy prices on technology adoption in other areas of the economy. Jaffe and Stavins (1995) find a positive response of the adoption of thermal insulation technology to energy prices, though the magnitude is small compared to the effect of other variables. Rose and Joskow (1990) conclude that electricity generators adopt fuel saving technology in response to an increase in the price of fuel. Newell, Jaffe and Stavins (1999) report that air conditioners and water heaters became more energy efficient after increases in the price of energy.
A few studies have investigated the correlation between plant age and technology adoption, finding mixed results. 7 Dunne (1994) This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model of technology adoption and derives the estimating equation. Section 3 describes the measurement of the price of energy, and 6 Also related to this paper, Anderson and Newell (2004) investigate the Department of Energy's (DOE) Industrial Assessment Centers program, in which the DOE performs audits of manufacturing plants and suggests projects that might reduce energy requirements. Anderson and Newell find that high energy prices increase the probability of undertaking a project, though other variables, such as expected implementation costs, have larger effects. The program covers a limited number of small and medium-sized plants that request the audit, so it is difficult to extend the results to the entire sector; nevertheless, they find a small, but precisely estimated, effect of energy prices.
7 Much of the literature on technology adoption characterizes the factors that affect adoption, such as plant size and expected profitability. Recent work has studied network effects (e.g. Saloner and Shepard, 1995) and the need for complementary inputs such as skilled labor (e.g. Caselli and Coleman, 2001 ). This paper takes energy prices to be exogenous to these factors, and the emphasis of this paper is on the entrant/incumbent distinction, which has received little attention in the literature. Section 4 describes the data. The main results are presented in Section 5, which also discusses the empirical support for the main assumptions. In Section 6, I use the results to calculate the effect of technology adoption on the long run response of output to an energy price shock.
.2 Variable elasticity of substitution
I relax the assumption that entering plants have the same elasticity of substitution as existing plants. For simplicity, I assume that the price shock coincides with a shock to ρ, changing it to ρ 1 . This setup is sufficient to show that the difference in the effect of the shock for entrants and incumbents depends on technology, as before, but also on the different substitution elasticities.
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The energy-price elasticity of plants remaining from before the shock is σ S . For entering plants, the parameters from equation (4) differ from the baseline case because ρ changes. The long run elasticity is e σ S + e σ T , with e σ S and e σ T defined similarly to before, replacing ρ with ρ 1 .
Thus, the comparison of the elasticities at t = 1 is:
There are two terms: the effect of technology adoption and the difference between the price elasticities of entrants and incumbents. In Figure 1 , e σ T corresponds to the inward shift of the demand curve and e σ S − σ S reflects the rotation of the demand curve. An important empirical question is whether the price elasticity is constant, i.e., whether e σ S − σ S = 0.
Empirical Specification
I derive the estimating equation from the model in the previous section. I discuss the assumptions under which the comparison of entrants and incumbents yields an accurate measure of the effect of technology adoption on energy demand.
I return to the case where ρ is constant. The log energy efficiency of an entering plant at time t is:
The current price of energy affects the energy efficiency of an entrant through the choice of technology and factor substitution.
In comparison, the log energy efficiency of an incumbent at time t is:
where e p E 0 is the real price of energy at the time the plant entered. The price of energy affects the energy efficiency of an existing plant via substitution; by assumption, it cannot adopt technology. I define the constant N it , a dummy variable equal to one if the plant is an entrant, and combine equations (9) and (10):
Thus, three factors determine energy demand: technology adoption by entrants, substitution, and a plant-specific constant, which depends on TFP and whether or not the plant is an entrant.
Note that by the CES assumption, the price elasticities are equal in equations (9) and (10), allowing me to obtain equation (11).
I add an error term and a matrix of controls, and assume that the TFP component of β i is uncorrelated with the other variables. The real price of energy varies by industry (j), state (s) and year (discussed below). The estimating equation is:
where {δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , η} are parameters to be estimated, X it is a matrix of controls with coefficient vector η, and ε it is a random disturbance term. The matrix X it includes a constant, industryregion-year interactions, state fixed effects and a set of cohort dummies, equal to one if the plant entered in the corresponding year and zero in the year of entry. The cohort dummies account for the dependence of the intercept on the price of energy at the time of entry. The industry-region-year interactions control for industry-region shocks.
The parameter δ 1 measures the effect of the price of energy on the differential log energy efficiency of entrants and incumbents. Under the simplifying assumptions discussed below, this captures the effect of price-induced technology adoption on energy demand. δ 2 measures the energy price elasticity for entrants and incumbents, and the concavity of the production function implies that δ 2 is negative. δ 3 is the average difference in energy efficiency between entrants and incumbents.
There are several issues related to the identification of the effect of technology adoption on energy demand. To address the possible endogeneity of the price of energy, I compute a fixed-weight price index, described in Section 3. Industry shocks, technological change and substitution should not affect the price index.
Equation (12) includes the current price of energy. This specification allows for the simultaneous measurement of the price elasticity and the effect of technology on energy demand. This is the appropriate measure if the price of energy follows a random walk process. In the sample, the average plant operates for about 10 years, and other work (e.g., Pindyck, 1999) suggests that a random walk is a reasonable approximation over that time horizon. Mean reversion would imply that the results underestimate the effect of technological change. Below I relax the random walk assumption and use a vector autoregression (VAR) to forecast energy prices, which yields similar results.
I now discuss the three simplifying assumptions. First, the price of energy is uncorrelated with the difference in the average TFP of entrants and incumbents. Several approaches discussed below suggest that the price of energy is not strongly correlated with the productivity of entrants and incumbents.
The second assumption is that entering and existing plants have an equal and constant substitution elasticity. Diamond, McFadden and Rodriguez argue that an identifying assumption, such as this one, is necessary to distinguish technological change from a change in the substitution elasticity. If the asssumption does not hold, the estimate of the shift in the demand curve would be biased for two reasons. First, as equation (8) shows, δ 1 would measure the combined effect of a rotation and shift of the energy demand curve (see Figure 1 ).
The other concern is that the substitution elasticity may vary along the energy demand curve (as in the case of a translog production function 
Construction of the Price of Energy
Before discussing the data and the main results, I describe the construction and variation of the measured price of energy. I compute the nominal price of energy as the weighted sum of fuel and electricity prices:
where p E jst is the price of energy in industry j, state s and year t, and w jsf is the share of energy (in BTUs) for industry j in state s for energy source f (natural gas, electricity, coal, residual and distillate).
15 π fst is the price in current dollars per million BTUs by state, source and year.
I compute the real price of energy, e p E jst , by dividing p E jst by the output price for industry j in state s and year t.
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There is cross sectional and time series variation in p E jst because of variation in the BTU weights and the variation of the state by year energy prices. The regressions below include industry-region-year interactions and state fixed effects, so I discuss the remaining variation.
A state price shock, to one energy source or to all sources, affects relative energy prices in a given industry and region. The size of the effect varies according to the weights. On the other hand, if energy prices are uniformly high, either in a given year and region, or in one state over the entire period, this does not effect p E jst . An aggregate or regional price shock can affect relative energy prices within a given industryregion-year cell because of the BTU weights. For example, in the Nitrogen Fertilizer industry (SIC 2873), the natural gas BTU share is lower in Ohio than in other states in the same region.
In response to a regional shock to natural gas prices, the price of energy for Fertilizer plants in
Ohio would fall compared to Fertilizer plants in the rest of the region. 15 In 1975 the average BTU shares across states and industries were 0.56 for natural gas, 0.17 for electricity, 0.11 for coal, 0.11 for residual, and 0.05 for distillate.
16 I also construct the price of electricity and fuels separately. A plant's real electricity price is the price of electricity in the corresponding state and year, divided by the output price. The nominal fuel price is computed similarly to equation (13), except that each weight is the BTU share of the fuel in total fuel use for the industry and state. It is important to note that the BTU weights, w jsf , do not change over time. Thus, industryspecific substitution between energy sources and technological change, both of which are endogenous responses to energy prices, do not affect p E jst . I briefly discuss the historical patterns of the different energy prices. Figure 2 shows the average real prices of natural gas, electricity, coal, residual and distillate from 1970-1997, with prices normalized to one in 1967. Natural gas and oil prices moved together closely, and electricity prices followed a similar pattern, but varied less over time. Coal prices show a different pattern, peaking in the early 1970s and declining afterwards.
Natural gas prices varied dramatically over time and space, due to regulation, transportation costs and oil prices. In the 1970s, federal regulation reduced the domestic supply of natural gas and contributed to a severe shortage and price increases (see MacAvoy and Pindyck, 1975) .
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Beginning in the late 1970s, prices were gradually deregulated, and by the end of the sample, prices mainly reflected differences in transportation costs. Electricity prices were regulated over most of this period at the state level, and did not respond quickly to demand. They depended, inter alia, on fuel costs (most often coal), capital costs and the composition of electricity generators (e.g. coal-fired versus hydropower). There was considerable geographic, and some inter-temporal, variation in the availability of hydroelectric and nuclear power.
Coal prices varied differently from other sources due to the geographic location of mines and environmental regulation. Transportation costs are particularly high for coal, relative to extraction costs, making geographic variation an important determinant of relative prices. Sulfur emissions regulation in the 1970s and 1990s raised the demand for low sulfur coal supplied from the west. The regulation affected coal prices in a much different manner from the OPEC shocks and natural gas shortage. Most industries use little coal directly, though coal prices had a large effect on electricity prices. Import prices of oil, transportation costs and regulation were the main sources of variation for petroleum product prices. For much of the period, OPEC held nominal crude oil prices stable, except during the two major shocks in the 1970s. Regulatory bodies such as the Texas 17 During the shortage, supply was completely halted to many customers, and observed prices may not reflect the true costs. Below I find that potential mis-measurement of true natural gas prices does not affect the results.
Railroad Commission further maintained price stability by controlling the domestic supply (see Hamilton, 1984) . The OPEC shocks affected the price of energy for plants in states with a high cost share of distillate or residual, relative to other states in a given industry and region. Natural gas is a close substitute for oil, which explains the high correlation of these prices across states and time.
In the baseline regression I assume that the sources of variation for all energy sources are exogenous. This assumption is supported by the importance of transportation costs and the actions of government regulators, who were unlikely to respond to changes in energy demand. I obtain similar results using the aggregate price of energy, which does not rely on this assumption. The main variables are energy efficiency, the real price of energy and the entrant dummy variable. Energy efficiency is measured in units of real energy consumed to real output, where prices are normalized to one in 1967 (i.e., energy efficiency is equal to the cost share of energy in 1967). The CM contains output and energy expenditure in nominal dollars, so I primarily describe the price deflators. I construct a detailed product price index, which varies both geographically and by SIC product code. In each Census year there is a product file containing revenues and quantities for a large number of 7-digit products. Missing or imputed quantity data and concerns about data quality prevent me from using plant level product prices. Instead, I use the least aggregated prices available for each plant. I begin with 7-digit by state prices, and compute chain-weighted prices for different aggregation levels, up to 4-digit product code.
For each product a plant produces, I use the least aggregated price for which there are at least 50 observations in the product files. A plant's shipments deflator is the weighted sum of the product prices.
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In comparison, most other studies use the 4-digit industry prices from the NBER Manu- 18 The DOE prices are available for all sources from 1970-2000. The DOE has publishted pre-1970 data for some sources, which does not appear to be comparable. I assume that nominal energy prices were constant between 1967-1970, which is supported by the trends in the pre-1970 prices. 19 In computing the prices I drop prices below the 5th and above the 95th percentiles in an industry-state-year cell to limit the effect of outliers. The main results are insensitive to changing either the cutoff percentile or the number of plants required to use a price.
facturing Productivity Database (MP).
20 I construct the more detailed product prices for three reasons. First, there is considerable geographic variation of output prices in the data, both within and across years. Second, because I use state-level energy price data, the detailed prices prevent all geographic variation in the real price of energy from being attributed to the DOE prices and energy weights. Third, I deflate each plant's products by an appropriate product deflator, rather than an industry deflator. This approach yields a more accurate price deflator for plants producing a large share of products from other industries. The correlation between the product prices and the NBER prices is high. As the results show below, using the NBER prices instead of the CM-and DOE-based prices yields similar estimated magnitudes, though the precision is considerably lower.
To construct the dependent variable, log energy efficiency, I compute an ideal price index for energy. I use the DOE state prices and state by industry energy input cost shares, computed from the ASM and MECS for 1975-1997 . I assume the shares were constant before 1975, and I extrapolate between years when there is no survey available. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of real energy use (energy expenditure divided by the energy price index) to real output (reported shipments divided by the shipments deflator).
The previous section described the construction of the log real price of energy, which is an independent variable. The nominal price of energy is the weighted sum of the DOE state energy prices (see equation (13)). The weights are the average BTU shares computed from the 1975 ASM fuel survey, which vary by industry and state. 21 I deflate the nominal energy price by the industry by state output price. The latter is the weighted sum of product prices across an industry and state.
In summary, the dependent variable and independent variable use different deflators. The dependent variable uses plant specific product prices and an ideal price index for energy, computed from cost shares that vary over time. The independent variable uses industry by state output prices and a fixed weight energy price index, using BTU shares.
The entrant dummy variable is equal to one when a plant appears in the CM for the first time. I construct the variable using the plant identification number, which links observations of each plant over time. 22 As a result, I measure entry for some plants several years after they 20 An exception is Foster et al. (2004) , who find that geographic variation in output prices greatly affects estimated productivity. 21 The fixed weights imply that the measured price of energy over-estimates increases in the true price index. This would bias the results if the measurement error were correlated with the entrant dummy. This does not appear to be a significant concern, however. The price of electricity and electricity efficiency do not depend on these weights, and the results are similar for electricity and total energy (see Table 7) . 22 There may be some measurement error for this variable, as plants can appear in the CM that do not operate. Using employment to impute entry (following Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996) yields almost identical results. enter, and do not include plants that enter and exit between Census years. Data limitations prevent me from measuring entry more precisely for the entire sample.
The sample includes all plant-year observations in the CM, from 1967-1997 (I use the 1963 Census to identify entrants in 1967). I drop "administrative record" plants, as is customary in using the CM. These are typically small plants for which most variables except payroll have been imputed. I also omit observations with non-positive output or energy expenditure. The dataset includes 1,284,597 observations for 563,961 plants. Figure 3 shows the same pattern graphically, for 1972-1987. 25 The series for incumbents is the output-weighted mean log energy efficiency of plants that operated in the previous Census (plants for which the entrant dummy in equation (12) show the mean energy efficiency by entry cohort.
The figure shows that entering plants are relatively more efficient than incumbents when the price of energy is high. The 1972 cohort, which entered before the price shock, is 0.17 more efficient than incumbents in 1972. The average log energy efficiency of the 1977 cohort, most of which entered before or during the first shock, is about 0.29 below the incumbents, but is similar to the 1972 cohort. In contrast, the 1982 cohort is further below the incumbents and other entry cohorts. The 1987 cohort, which entered as energy prices fell, is closer to the incumbents than is the 1982 cohort. The 1982 cohort remains more efficient than the other groups in 1987. As discussed above, one concern is that entrants may have a different substitution elasticity than incumbents. The fact that the 1982 cohort does not increase energy demand by more than the other groups suggests that this is not the case. 23 There is a considerable amount of variation across plants in the same entry cohort and year, some of which appears to be due to reporting errors. In particular, the standard deviation of the cost share is often quite large. This is driven by the presence of a few outliers; for example, in no year do more than 100 plants report a cost share larger than 1. As shown in Table 2 , omitting these outlying plants from the regressions does not affect the results. 24 The median energy efficiency (not reported) shows a similar pattern. 25 I omit the other years for clarity.
Results

Basic Specification
This section discusses the estimated coefficients from equation (12), using plant data from 1967-1997. The model is estimated by Weighted Least Squares, using the plant's share in shipments for the corresponding year to account for the reporting errors of small plants. 26 Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White formula. Column 1 of Table 2 shows the baseline specification, which includes industry-region-year and state dummies to control for demand shocks and fixed differences across states. The dependent variable is log energy efficiency and I include a full set of entry cohort dummies. The estimate of the interaction of the log price of energy and the entrant dummy is -0.100, with standard error 0.026 (significant at the one percent level), meaning that the relative efficiency of entrants improves when the price of energy rises. The estimate of δ 2 , the energy price elasticity, is -0.172 with standard error 0.019. 27 The price of energy is demeaned in all regressions, and entrants are about 8 percent more efficient on average.
The magnitudes imply that technology explains a significant, though relatively small amount of the observed changes in energy demand. For example, between 1972 and 1982 the real price of energy rose 150 percent while energy efficiency improved by 33 percent. The estimate of the interaction coefficient implies that about 30 percent of the observed change in efficiency was due to technology adoption. These results agree with Popp (2001) , who performs an analogous calculation for a set of energy intensive industries, and finds that one-third of the observed decline in energy use was due to innovation. 28 In Section 6 I return to the question of how much technology adoption reduces the long run effect of a price shock on GDP.
Recall that some cross sectional variation of the price of energy is due to fixed differences in industry weights and energy prices. In column 2, I include a full set of industry-state interactions, to eliminate cross sectional variation in energy prices. The estimate of δ 1 , -0.077, is similar to the baseline, and is significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that transportation costs and other time-invariant factors are not driving the results.
It is possible that the specification in column 1 does not adequately account for industry heterogeneity. In column 3, I add to the baseline specification the interactions of the log price 26 Dhrymes (1992) finds that there is less measurement error for large plants. Presumably this is because the Census Bureau focuses on publishing aggregate statistics. It checks the responses from large plants more carefully for missing values or nonsensical answers. 27 It appears that this estimate reflects a plant's ability to adjust its energy demand, rather than cross-plant heterogeneity. The price elasticity measured from a first differenced regression of energy efficiency on the price of energy (including industry-region-year interactions) is similar to the estimate of δ 2 in Table 2 . 28 Popp's estimate of δ 1 is much larger, -0.37, but because the industries in his sample experience a larger improvement in energy efficiency, he obtains a similar estimate of the importance of technological change.
of energy with a set of industry dummies. This allows each industry to have a different average log efficiency in each region and year, and a different price elasticity over the entire period. The estimate of δ 1 is quite similar to the baseline.
Next, I relax the assumption that plants in the same entry cohort have the same average log energy efficiency. In column 4 I interact the cohort dummies with a set of 2-digit industry dummies, which has little effect on the estimates.
Finally, since the model is estimated by Weighted Least Squares, it is possible that outlying observations affect the results. Reporting errors are common in the CM, and are a particularly likely source of measurement error. To address this concern I calculate the 5th and 95th percentile of the energy cost share (energy expenditure divided by value of shipments) for each industryregion-year-entrant cell. Column 5 omits outlying observations, and the results remain robust.
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The magnitude of the energy price-entrant interaction, δ 1 , is relatively stable and statistically significant after accounting for industry, geographic, and entry-cohort heterogeneity, and does not appear to be affected by outliers. The remaining specifications assess the validity of the simplifying assumptions used to derive equation (12).
Sample Selection and Plant Heterogeneity
The assumption that the substitution elasticity is equal for entrants and incumbents is central to the identification of the baseline equation. I postpone that discussion to the next section, because it is first necessary to assess whether the sample used in Table 2 is representative.
Since the productivity distribution depends on entry and exit, there is a problem of sample selection. Existing approaches, such as a Heckman correction or methods based on the propensity score (e.g., Angrist, 1995) require a sample where the selection decision is observed and the independent variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved variables. The CM does not meet these conditions, because I do not observe potential entrants that do not enter.
I consider a regional market for entry, analogous to Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (2002) . I assume that the distribution from which potential entrants are drawn, G(A i ), is constant in a given industry, region and year. In the model in section 2.1, the fraction of entrants at time t is R ∞
, is increasing in the price of energy, a high price of energy would cause the entry of fewer, more productive plants. The average entrant would be more efficient when the price is high, introducing the possibility of a spurious correlation I use the log of a count of entrants for the plant's state, industry and year of entry (the same level of variation as the price of energy) to proxy for unobserved productivity. A negative correlation of this variable with the price of energy would suggest that a high price of energy causes the entry of more productive plants.
I construct a second test using the survival of entrants. Given a stable distribution of potential entrants, plants from an entry cohort with greater than average productivity would be more likely to survive to the next Census. A positive correlation of the price of energy with survival would indicate that the price of energy is positively correlated with the productivity of entrants. Table 3 shows the correlations between the log price of energy and entry, survival of entrants and exit. In all regressions, the dependent variable is aggregated to the industry-state-year level. I include state fixed effects and a full set of industry-region-year interactions. I weight observations by the total shipments of plants in the corresponding cell. In column 1, the dependent variable is the log of the count of entrants, and the coefficient on the log price of energy is 0.059, with standard error 0.027. As noted above, a negative coefficient would suggest a spurious correlation in Table 2 , so this does not appear to be a significant concern.
Entry and Survival of Entrants
The positive correlation in column 1 implies that the results may be biased downward.
However, there are two concerns with that regression. First, there are a large number of cells with zero entrants, which are not included in the log specification. Second, energy prices may be positively correlated with the number of plants operating in a state and industry. Industrystate-year cells with more plants may have more turnover, which would result in a positive correlation between the price of energy and entry. In column 2 the dependent variable is the ratio of entrants to the number of plants operating in the cell, which addresses both issues.
The estimate is negative and insignificant, and the implied elasticity is quite small, less than -0.01. Although the relationship between entry and the price of energy is sensitive to alternative specifications, there is no evidence of a significant negative correlation.
In column 3, the dependent variable is the log of survival, and in column 4, it is survival divided by the number of entrants. I do not include industry-state cells for 1997 because I do not observe whether 1997 entrants survive. In both cases the price of energy has an insignificant effect on survival, which provides further support for the assumption that plant productivity is not strongly correlated with the price of energy.
For completeness, Table 3 includes results for plant exit. Although there is no general relationship between exit and plant productivity, large or significant coefficients might indicate bias. The dependent variable in column 5 is the log of the number of plants that exited between the previous and current Census, and in column 6 it is the ratio of exiting plants to the initial number of plants operating. In both regressions the coefficient on the price of energy is positive, though the elasticity is much smaller and less precisely estimated using the exit fraction. If less productive plants are more likely to exit, the estimate in column 5 would imply that the baseline results are biased towards zero. In the sample, there is a weak correlation between the number of plants exiting and the average energy efficiency of those plants, which implies that this bias is likely to be small. Table 4 reports several regressions that include proxies for unobserved heterogeneity. Columns 1 through 4 add as controls to equation (12) the dependent variables from columns 1 through 4 in Table 3 . I use the entry or survival measure in the year the plant entered; the variable is constant during the life of the plant. These variables proxy for the average productivity of entrants in the industry year and state the plant entered. In each case the estimate of δ 1 is unchanged from the baseline result. 30 The coefficient on log entry in column 1 is small and marginally significant, which suggests that this variable is not strongly correlated with the average efficiency of entrants, as would be the case if sample selection were driving the results.
Controls for Unobserved Heterogeneity
The survival variables in columns 3 and 4 are negative and significant, in agreement with the hypothesis that plants with greater TFP use less energy and are more likely to survive, but this relationship does not affect the main estimates.
Recent methods of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity rely on predicted relationships between unobserved and observed variables. For example, Olley and Pakes (1996) argue that log investment can proxy for unobserved productivity, but in this sample missing values (i.e., zero reported investment) would greatly reduce the sample size. Levinsohn and Petrin (2001) Other research in the manufacturing sector (e.g. Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995) has shown that plants within the same year and industry enter with different capital stocks and employment, possibly due to productivity differences. In columns 5 and 6, I control for the log capital stock and log employment the year the plant enters. The regression in column 5 spans 1972-1992 because of data availability. 31 Both of the productivity proxies are positive and precisely estimated, but the main coefficients of interest are unaffected.
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Substitution Elasticities of Entrants and Incumbents
The CES assumption implies that entrants and incumbents have the same substitution elasticity, and that the substitution elasticity is constant for a given technology. Table 5 shows that relaxing the CES assumption does not affect the results.
Section 2.1.2 shows that if entrants' technology allows for easier substitution, δ 1 would overestimate the shift of the demand curve. In column 1 of Table 5 , I test whether entrants in a given year have a different price elasticity from incumbents in the corresponding year. I estimate the following equation:
where O it is a set of dummy variables, equal to one if the plant operates in the corresponding year. Thus, O it is constant over the life of the plant, and a plant that operates from [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] will have O i72 = 1 and O i77 = 1. T it is a set of dummy variables equal to one if the plant enters that year, and is also constant over the life of the plant. The term O it ln p E jst is the interaction of O it with the price of energy, and similarly for T it ln p E jst . This specification estimates a separate price elasticity for each year, maintaining the assumption that existing plants do not adopt technology. The energy price-entrant interaction allows the price elasticity of an entry cohort to differ from that of the corresponding population of incumbents. Note that because O it and T it are constant over the life of a plant, this regression does not compare the energy efficiency of entrants with all incumbents, as in the baseline specification. Rather, it compares the price elasticities of different sets of plants after they have entered, i.e., their short run price elasticities.
In column 1 I include observations from 1972-1997 because the log real energy price is normalized to zero in 1967. The price-entrant interactions are insignificant and small in magnitude, suggesting that entering plants have a similar price elasticity to incumbents. In addition, the estimate of δ 1 (not reported) is unaffected if I estimate the baseline estimating equation, (12), omitting plants that operated in a given year (e.g., all plants for which O i72 = 1). These results suggest that the price elasticities of entrants and incumbents are similar, and that the estimate of δ 1 is unbiased. 31 More specifically, the capital stock for entrants is only available for those years. I set the initial capital stock of a 1972 incumbent equal to its capital stock in 1972. 32 The estimate of the interaction terms using the corresponding samples with the baseline specification are -0.101 (standard error 0.019) and -0.092 (standard error 0.02).
A second concern is that the substitution elasticity may not be constant for a given technology. An increase in the price of energy would cause the elasticity of existing plants to change as they move along their demand curve. Entrants would have a different elasticity from incumbents on average, even if they use the same technology. Columns 2-4 return to the baseline specification, using observations from 1972-1997, and allow the price elasticity of incumbents to vary over time. Since energy prices varied significantly from 1972-1997 (see Figure 2) , the estimate of δ 1 would change if the price elasticity varies with the price of energy. Column 2 includes price of energy by year interactions, which allows for a different average substitution elasticity for incumbents each year. The specifications in columns 3 and 4 estimate a separate price elasticity by region and year, and by 2 digit industry and year. In each case the estimate of δ 1 is quite similar to the baseline.
Robustness
Alternative Measures of the Price of Energy
In Table 6 , I use several alternative measures of the price of energy and find similar results. As discussed earlier, much of the variation in the price of energy is driven by aggregate shocks to the price of oil and the natural gas shortage. The geographic variation reflects regulatory and transportation differences, for which the exogeneity argument may be weaker. In column 1, I
use the log aggregate price of energy, which is the log of a weighted average of the industry by state energy prices. The estimate of the interaction is -0.045 with standard error 0.012, which is smaller than the estimate in column 1 of Table 2 . The fact that the estimate is negative and significant suggests that the main results do not arise purely from cross sectional price variation.
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Recall that in the model I consider a one-time and permanent increase in the price of energy.
In that case, or if the price of energy follows a random walk, the current price is the appropriate measure of the expected future price. On the other hand, if the actual price were mean-reverting, the results would underestimate the effect of technology adoption on energy demand. In column 2 I relax the random walk assumption. I estimate a vector autoregression with the prices of natural gas, electricity, coal, residual and distillate, using two lags and state prices from 1970-2000. For a given year and energy price, the expected price is the discounted sum of the linear forecasts for the following 10 years. I weight the forecasted prices using sector-average BTU weights to obtain the aggregate forecasted price. The estimate on the interaction term in column 2 is -0. Table 2 , and the precision is lower, supporting the use of the DOE-and LRD-based prices.
Additional Robustness Checks
Several studies report an asymmetric response to the price of energy. For example, Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) find that employment responds more to a price increase than to a decrease. Fuel-saving and electricity-saving technology adoption may respond differently to prices, because of different available technologies and different amounts of price variation (see Figure   2 ). In columns 3 and 4, I separate energy use into electricity and fuel consumption, divided by output. 35 The results for fuel and electricity efficiency are similar to the results for total energy efficiency.
Other work with the Census of Manufactures (e.g., Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1989) suggests that plants belonging to multi-plant firms perform differently from single-plant firms. In column 6, I consider whether the effect of technology adoption varies by an industry's energy intensity. I omit industries in the top quartile of the distribution of energy cost share.
The estimates are robust to restricting the sample in this manner. In column 8, I exploit the fact that the variation of coal prices was different from other energy prices. This provides a test for the existence of an omitted variable correlated with the price of energy. Consider an omitted variable correlated with natural gas and oil prices, which affects the energy efficiency of entrants. Given the relatively low correlation between coal and oil prices, it is unlikely that this variable would be strongly correlated with coal prices; the omitted variable bias would be smaller for plants in coal intensive industries. In column 8 I allow coal intensive industries to have a different response to the price of energy. I interact the main independent variables with a dummy variable, equal to one if the plant's industry is in the 90th percentile of the cost share of coal in total energy expenditure (computed from the 1975 ASM fuel file). The estimate of δ 1 is close to the baseline, and none of the coal industry interactions are significantly different from zero, which suggests that these industries responded similarly to the price of energy.
During the natural gas shortage, supply to many areas was eliminated, and the observed price of natural gas may not always reflect the true cost. Since I cannot observe the availability of natural gas to an individual plant, I use the ASM fuel survey to identify counties in 1975 with low natural gas use. In column 9, I omit observations of plants in counties belonging to the bottom 15th percentile of the distribution, and the estimates are unchanged from the baseline.
Finally, plants may substitute towards intermediate materials when energy prices rise. For example, plants may find it less expensive to import some energy intensive goods, rather than producing the materials themselves. Since the dependent variable uses gross output, this substitution would appear to increase energy efficiency, even though output per worldwide energy consumption has not changed. This does not appear to be a major concern, as shown in column 10; estimating the baseline specification with value added (gross output net of materials and energy expenditure) yields identical results.
Technology Adoption by Existing Plants
If entering plants adopt technology, it is likely that they would report changes in capital investment or retirements. I construct a balanced panel of plants in the CM and ASM from 1972-1988.
I find little evidence of technology adoption by existing plants.
The balanced panel consists of 12,014 plants. I compute each plant's capital stock using the book value of machines in 1972 and the perpetual inventory method. Log investment is the first difference of the log capital stock to account for plant-year observations with zero investment.
I cannot observe energy-related capital investment. As a proxy, I interact the price of energy with the energy cost share of a plant's industry. A positive coefficient would imply that if the price increases, investment in energy intensive industries increases, which is likely to include energy-related technology.
In Table 8 all variables are in first differences, to remove plant fixed effects, and all regressions include industry-region-year interactions. I use the current price of energy in column 1, the 5-year lag price of energy in column 2 and the aggregate forecasted price of energy in column 3, interacting the prices with the energy cost share for the corresponding industry. The dependent variable is log investment. Plants in energy intensive industries invest more when the price was high five years earlier (column 2). However, plants do not respond to the forecasted price, and there is limited evidence of technology adoption.
If a plant adopts technology, it likely retires capital that used the old technology. Retirement data may have less measurement error than investment, and I report results using data on capital retirements for the years 1977-1988 (due to data availability). As columns 4-6 show, log retirements do not respond positively to any of the measures of the price of energy. There is little evidence that existing plants adopt technology, but without more detailed capital data, it is impossible to make further progress on this question.
Implications for Energy Prices and Growth
The Introduction noted the connection between the price of energy and economic activity, citing recent concerns about the prospects of rising energy prices. In this section I use the empirical estimates to calculate the effect of technology adoption on the long run relationship between GDP and the price of energy. The results suggest a limited effect of technology adoption.
I consider a 10 percent permanent increase in the price of energy, which represents the effect of declining natural resource supplies or a carbon tax. I compare the effect on steady state output for two models: one without technological change, and one with technological change.
I use the baseline model in section 2.1.1, except that I fix the number of plants in the industry.
A constant number of plants enter and exit the industry in each period, and industry output is determined by output per plant.
I define the variable ε NT Y as the long run elasticity of output to the price of energy in the model without technology adoption. An increase in the price of energy causes energy consumption to decrease, lowering output. The magnitude of this effect depends on the price elasticity, and I use the estimated value of σ S , setting σ T equal to zero.
Analogously, ε T Y is the price elasticity of output for the model with technology adoption. In response to the shock, entering plants use better energy technology, which causes the demand curve for energy to shift towards the origin. This increases the level of output for a given amount of energy use, and allows output to recover in the long run. The long run effect of a price shock on output depends on the estimated values of σ S and σ T .
To compare the two models, I calculate the ratio ε T Y /ε NT Y , which measures the amount that long run output falls in the model with technological change, relative to model without technological change. This ratio is equal to 1 − ε A E , where ε A E , is the elasticity of energy technology to the price of energy. This elasticity is unobserved, but can be calculated from the empirical results, using the fact that the estimate of σ T is equal to ρ 1−ρ ε A E (see equation (4)). Thus, ε A E ' 0.12, and the long run decrease of output in the model with technological change is about 88 percent of the decrease of the model without technological change.
In contrast, Atkeson and Kehoe simulate a putty-clay model and find that technology adop-tion causes energy prices to have a small long run effect on output. They conclude that their results are similar to earlier empirical estimates of the long run response of energy demand (e.g., Griffin and Gregory, 1976) , which use aggregate data to identify the effect of technology. These estimates may be biased upward by omitted variables, however, as the results in this paper suggest a much smaller effect of technological change. Thus, the Atkeson and Kehoe analysis may overstate the effects of technological change, though future work is needed to reconcile the results.
Conclusions
This study measures the effect of price-induced technology adoption on energy demand. The results have important implications for understanding the long run relationship between the price of energy and growth. A 1 percent increase in the price of energy leads to a 0.1 percent increase in the relative efficiency of entering plants versus incumbents. I find empirical support for the simplifying assumptions used to derive the estimating equation. The estimates are robust to a variety of specification checks. The calculation in Section 6 suggests that technology adoption has a small effect on the sensitivity of steady state output to the price of energy.
The results are important for two other recent discussions. First, several papers (e.g., Goulder and Schneider, 1999) have incorporated price-induced technological change into climate change models. Popp (2004) calibrates a long run growth model and calculates the net benefit of implementing a carbon tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, to accurately assess the role of price-induced technological change, these models should be calibrated to empirical estimates of the average effect of technology adoption; future work may incorporate the results reported here.
Second, recent energy price increases have renewed interest in the effects of energy prices on the value of installed capital. Alpanda and Peralta-Alva (2004) argue that the 1973/4 oil shock caused the obsolescence of energy intensive capital, which explains the coinciding decline in the stock market. In contrast, Wei (2003) argues that the effect of the price of energy on the value of capital should be roughly proportional to its cost share, and that the oil shock did not have much effect on the stock market. The results from this paper cannot be directly integrated into these models, so further work is needed to assess whether the oil shocks led to the replacement of a large fraction of the capital stock, and whether this mechanism can explain the apparently large effects of energy prices on the economy. 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 -4.477 -4.458 -4.678 -5.329 -5.028 -4.889 -5.115 (1.037) ( 1.044 Energy cost share is constructed as in Table 1 and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the cost share are computed for each industry-region-year-entrant cell. Column 5 omits outlying observations. Table 2 Response of Energy Efficiency to the Price of Energy, 1967 Energy, -1997 Dependent Variable: Log Energy Efficiency
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is log energy efficiency, constructed as in Table 1 . Log price of energy is the log of the weighted sum of state by year energy source prices from the DOE, using BTU weights constructed from the LRD, divided by the output price (see equation (13)). Entrant is a dummy variable, equal to one if the plant appears for the first time in the CM. Log price of energy x entrant is the interaction of the two variables. The sample is constructed as described in the text. All regressions are estimated by Weighted Least Squares, using the plant's share in shipments for the corresponding year as the weight. The cohort of a plant refers to the year the plant first appears in the Census. All regressions include a full set of cohort dummy variables, equal to one if the plant belongs to the corresponding cohort, and equal to zero the year the plant enters. All columns include a full set of industry-region-year interactions and state dummies, and column 2 also contains industry-state interactions. Column 3 includes interactions of the price of energy with the industry's 3-digit industry. Column 4 includes the interactions of the plant's entry cohort with its 2-digit industry. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable, log price of energy and entrant dummy are computed as in Table 2 . The sample is the same as column 1 of Table 2 , except that it does not include observations in 1967. Regressions are estimated by Weighted Least Squares, using the share of plant shipments in the corresponding year as the weight, and include industry-region-year interactions and state dummies. Columns 2-4 include cohort dummies. Operate is a set of dummy variables, equal to one if the plant operated in the corresponding year. New plant is a set of dummy variables, equal to one if the plant entered that year. Column 1 includes the operate and new plant variables, plus the interaction of all variables with the log price of energy. Column 2 includes a full set of log price of energy by year interactions. Column 3 includes log price of energy by region by year interactions, and column 4 includes log price of energy by 2 digit industry by year interactions.
Log Price of Energy x 1997 New Plant Table 2 . Column 1 uses the log aggregate price of energy, the log of the weighted mean of the individual plant prices. The log aggregate forecasted price is calculated from a VAR with two lags, estimated using the DOE state prices for natural gas, electricity, coal, residual and distillate. The forecasted price of each energy source is the sum of the current price and the linear prediction of the price over the next ten years, discounted by ten percent. The log aggregate forecasted price of energy is the log of the weighted sum of the energy source forecasts, using aggregate weights (see text). Column 2 includes the interaction of the log forecasted price and the entrant dummy. Column 3 uses the 5-year lag of the log price of is the ratio of coal expenditure to total energy costs by industry. Column 8 includes the interactions with the main independent variables of a dummy equal to one if the industry is above the 90th percentile of coal cost share. Column 9 excludes counties with natural gas consumption below the 15th percentile (see text). Real value added is equal to gross shipments, net of materials and energy expenditure, divided by the value added deflator. In column 10 the dependent variable is the log of real energy use divided by real value added, where real energy use is computed as in Table 2 .
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2 and 5-10 is log energy efficiency, constructed as in Table 2 . The dependent variable is log fuel efficiency in column 3 and log electricity efficiency in column 4, constructed using reported fuel and electricity expenditure and the real price of fuels and electricity (see text). Specifications in columns 1, 2 and 5-10 include the same independent variables as in column 1 of Table 2 , and observations are weighted by plant output. Column 3 uses the real price of fuel in place of the real price of energy to construct the independent variables, and column 4 uses the real price of electricity (see text). In column 1 standard errors are clustered by year, and by plant in column 2. In column 5 a dummy variable, equal to one if the plant does not belong to a pre-existing firm, is added plus its interaction with the price of energy. Column 6 omits plants belonging to industries in the top quartile of energy cost share, computed from the 1963 Census. Column 7 excludes plants in the four 2-digit industries with the largest share of electricity sales in total output: Paper, Chemicals, Petroleum and Primary Metals (see text). Coal cost share Table 7 Additional Robustness Checks Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes a balanced panel of plants appearing in all CM and ASM years from 1972-1988. All variables are in first differences. All regressions include industry-region-year dummies and are estimated by Weighted Least Squares, using the share of plant shipments in the corresponding year as the weight. The dependent variables are indicated in the column headings. Plant capital stocks are constructed using the perpetual inventory method, beginning with the 1972 book value of capital, subtracting retirements and deflating investment (see text). Log investment is the difference between the log capital stock in the current and previous years. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is log investment, and in columns 4-6 it is log retirements. Columns 1 and 4 use the log current price of energy, columns 2 and 5 use the 5-year lag, and columns 3 and 6 use the log aggregate forecasted price of energy, using a VAR with two lags (see Table 6 and the text). Energy intensity is the ratio of total energy costs to output in 1963 for the plant's industry, calculated from the 1963 Census of Manufactures.
Log Price of Energy The curves represent the demand for energy, as functions of the energy technology, A, and the price elasticity, σ. The price of energy is P 0 before a price shock, and after the shock the price is P Incumbents include plants that operated in the previous Census. Each entrant cohort includes plants that entered in the indicated year, and are still operating in the corresponding year. Each data point is the weighted mean log energy efficiency, computed as in Table 1 , using plant shipments as the weight (see text).
